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Abstract— Autonomous vehicles have the potential to increase
the capacity of roads via platooning, even when human drivers
and autonomous vehicles share roads. However, when users
of a road network choose their routes selfishly, the resulting
traffic configuration may be very inefficient. Because of this,
we consider how to influence human decisions so as to decrease
congestion on these roads. We consider a network of parallel
roads with two modes of transportation: (i) human drivers who
will choose the quickest route available to them, and (ii) ride
hailing service which provides an array of autonomous vehicle
ride options, each with different prices, to users. In this work,
we seek to design these prices so that when autonomous service
users choose from these options and human drivers selfishly
choose their resulting routes, road usage is maximized and
transit delay is minimized. To do so, we formalize a model
of how autonomous service users make choices between routes
with different price/delay values. Developing a preference-based
algorithm to learn the preferences of the users, and using a
vehicle flow model related to the Fundamental Diagram of
Traffic, we formulate a planning optimization to maximize a
social objective and demonstrate the benefit of the proposed
routing and learning scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Road congestion is a major and growing source of ineffi-
ciency, costing drivers in the United States billions of dollars
in wasted time and fuel [1]. The emergence of autonomous
vehicles promises to improve the efficiency of road usage to
some extent by forming platoons and smoothing traffic flow.
However, if drivers make their routing decisions selfishly and
seek to minimize their experienced delay, this can result in
suboptimal network performance [2]. Moreover, in the pres-
ence of selfish users, the increase in road capacity induced by
replacing some human-driven vehicles with autonomous ones
can paradoxically worsen average transit user delay [3]. The
adverse effects arise from the way humans make decisions
about how to route themselves, and the resulting inefficiency
can be very large, even unbounded [4].
It is therefore important to consider the effect that self-
interested users will have on the system. Previous works have
shown that if autonomous users are altruistic, average latency
can be greatly reduced [4]. However, it’s not realistic to
assume altruism in many scenarios; in this paper we consider
how to monetarily incentivize such prosocial behavior. We
consider the setting in which use of autonomous vehicles
is offered by some benevolent ride hailing service or social
planner which chooses prices for each of the routes. The
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users of the autonomous service will choose their routes, as
well as whether or not they even want to travel, based on
their time-money tradeoff. Then the remaining population
of human drivers will choose routes that minimize their
delay. The role of the social planner is then to choose prices
that will optimize some social objective, which includes
maximizing road usage and minimizing average delay. Our
model can be viewed as an indirect Stackelberg game – a
game in which a social planner controls some fraction of
the population’s actions and the remainder of the population
responds selfishly [5], [6]. However, in our model the planner
can only control its portion of the vehicle flow via pricing.
In order to do so effectively, the social planner needs a
model for how people make decisions between routes with
various prices and latencies. We model these choices as being
made based on a modification of Luce’s choice axiom [7], [8]
and we model human drivers as selfish agents who reach a
Wardrop Equilibrium, a configuration in which no one could
decrease their travel time by switching paths [9].
Moreover, we use a method of actively learning the
choices of autonomous service users via a series of queries
[10], [11]. This enables the planner to predict how au-
tonomous service users will react to a set of options after
a relatively low number of training queries. We verify that
this method accurately predicts human choice, and that
our planning algorithm can use this to improve network
performance, via experiment.
We summarize our contributions as follows.
• Learning Human Decisions: We develop an active
preference-based algorithm to learn how people value
the tradeoff between time and money, and choose their
preferred transportation option. This enables learning a
model of humans’ routing choices in a data-efficient
manner.
• Influencing Human Decisions: We formulate and solve
an optimization for ride hailing service to minimize
congestion and maximize the road network utilization
based on the learned model of human choice, while
constraining a minimum profit for the service supplier.
• We validate the learning algorithm and the optimization
formulation via simulations and user studies. Our results
suggest carefully designed pricing schemes can provide
significant improvements for traffic throughput.
Related Work. Previous works have shown the potential
benefits that autonomous vehicles can have for traffic net-
works, by increasing road capacity through platooning [12],
[13], damping shockwaves of slowing vehicles [14]–[16],
managing merges [17], and decongesting freeways in the
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event of accidents [18]. In [3], the authors show that the ca-
pacity improvement from platooning can actually worsen the
total delay experienced by users of the networks. Relatedly,
many works (e.g. [19], [20], on shared roads, [21]) analyze
and bound the inefficiency that can arise from network users
choosing their routes selfishly instead of following some
optimal routing.
As we use financial incentives to influence this behavior,
our formulation is related to work in tolling [22], including
works that consider users with different sensitivities to tolls
[23], [24]. In contrast to many of these works, as well as
some works that develop efficient algorithms for rebalancing
an autonomous fleet [25], we consider a probabilistic model
for human choice that has been empirically shown to reflect
human choice making processes [26], and we model vehicle
flow on shared roads based on the foundational Fundamental
Diagram of Traffic (FDT) [4], [27]. This model captures the
bifurcated nature of vehicle flow – when density is low, the
road is in free-flow and flow increases with vehicle density,
and when density is high, the road is congested and flow
decreases as density increases.
On the human choice models, there have recently been
a lot of effort on learning human reward functions which
are assumed to be sufficient to model the preferences. In-
verse reinforcement learning [28]–[31] and preference-based
learning [10], [11], [32], [33] are the most popular choices.
In this paper, we employ preference-based learning as it is a
natural fit to our problem. We actively synthesize queries as
a non-trivial generalization and extension of [10] for data-
efficiency and better usability.
II. PROBLEM SETTING
Vehicle Flow Model. We consider a nonatomic model in
which individual users control an infinitesimal unit of vehicle
flow and this quantity is treated as a continuous variable. To
model flow of mixed-autonomous traffic on roads, we use our
model in [4], summarized in this section. This is an extension
of the Fundamental Diagram of Traffic [27], in which flow
inhabits one of two regimes – free flow, in which the flow on
a road increases as vehicle density increases, and congestion,
in which flow decreases as density increases. The flow
decreases until the jam density, n¯i, at which point the flow
ceases entirely. Similarly, the relationship between latency
and flow on a road shows a similar divide: in free flow
latency is constant with respect to flow, and in congestion
latency increases as flow decreases. These behaviors are
shown in Fig. 1. v¯i denotes the free-flow speed of the road.
The transition between free flow and congestion occurs
when the density on a road exceeds the critical density of
that road, denoted n˜i. We model the effect of autonomous
vehicles as increasing this critical density, since autonomous
cars can maintain shorter headways than human drivers, as
follows.
n˜i(αi) :=
bi
αih
a
i + (1− αi)hhi
, (1)
where αi ∈ [0, 1] is the autonomy level, or fraction of
vehicles on road i that are autonomous, bi is the number
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Fig. 1: Vehicle flow model for mixed autonomy based on the Fundamental
Diagram of Traffic. (a) and (b) show flow vs density and latency vs flow
characteristics if all vehicles are either human-driven or autonomous, where
autonomy increases the critical density n˜i and the maximum flow F¯i of a
road. The blue and red regions correspond to the road being free-flow and
congested states, respectively, and the arrow denotes increasing density.
Fig. 2: Illustration of vehicle spacing if (a) autonomous vehicles maintain
the same headway behind any vehicle they follow, regardless of type, or (b)
autonomous vehicles can reorder themselves to form a large platoon. The
headway that the vehicles keep informs the critical density of a road, or the
density at which a road becomes congested.
of lanes on that road, and hai and h
h
i are the space occupied
by an autonomous and human driven car, respectively, when
traveling at the nominal velocity of the road. This model
[21] assumes that either the autonomous vehicles maintain
the same headway to any vehicle they may follow or that they
can rearrange themselves on a road to form large platoons
[34], [35], as shown in Fig. 2. Note that if autonomous
vehicles can keep shorter headways than human drivers (i.e.
hai < h
h
i ), the presence of autonomous cars increases the
critical density and therefore also increases the maximum
flow possible on a road, i.e. F¯i(1) > F¯i(0) where F¯i is a
function of autonomy level that gives the maximum capacity
of road i. Fig. 1 shows the effect of increased autonomy on
a road.
We use si to denote the state of road i such that si = 0
denotes it is in free flow and si = 1 denotes it is congested.
We use nhi and n
a
i to denote the density of human-driven and
autonomous vehicles, respectively on road i. Accordingly,
si =
{
0 nhi + n
a
i ≤ n˜i(nai/(nhi + nai))
1 otherwise .
We model the road as first-in-first-out, so αi = nai/(n
h
i +
nai) = f
a
i /(f
h
i + f
a
i ), where f
h
i and f
a
i respectively are the
human-driven and autonomous vehicle flow on road i.
The flow on a road, fi = f hi + f
a
i is a function of the
density of each vehicle type as follows.
fi(n
h
i , n
a
i) :=
v¯i · (nhi + nai), if nhi + nai ≤ n˜i(αi)
v¯i·n˜i(αi)·(n¯i−(nhi+nai))
n¯i−n˜i(αi) , if n˜i(αi) ≤ nhi + nai ≤ n¯i
0, otherwise .
(2)
We can then write the latency as a function of vehicle flow
and the state of the road [4], [6]:
`i(f
h
i , f
a
i , si) =
{
di
v¯i
if si = 0
di
(
n¯i
f hi+f
a
i
+ n˜i(αi)−n¯iv¯i·n˜i(αi)
)
if si = 1 .
where di is the length of road i.
We now know how to relate the vehicle flow to road
latency so we can start reasoning about how people choose
their routes.
Problem Overview. We describe the various facets of the
problem, preceded by a high-level overview of the objective.
We assume that the demand of human drivers is fixed, and
that the demand of people using the autonomous service
is elastic – if prices and latencies are high, some people
may choose not to use the autonomous mobility service.
Our goal is then to simultaneously maximize the number of
autonomous service users that can use the road, and minimize
the average delay experienced by all the people using the
roads.
Our control variables in this optimization are the latencies
on each road and the prices offered to the users for traveling
on the routes. However, we can’t arbitrarily choose prices
and latencies – we need to respect
1) the characteristics of the roads, in terms of how the
flow demand for a road corresponds to the latency on
that road, and
2) how people make decisions, making sure that the num-
ber of people who choose each option corresponds to
the latencies of the roads described in the options.
Moreover, we want to be fair and must therefore offer
the same pricing and routing options to all users of the
autonomous service.
How a population of users chooses between a variety of
price and latency pairs depends on their valuation of time
and money. Without knowing this choice model we cannot
plan vehicle flows and will not be able to ensure the result-
ing configuration matches our vehicle flow models for the
roads. Also, since different populations may have different
parameter distributions, we need to learn this tradeoff for
our population before we can estimate how many people
will choose which option. To untangle these constraints, in
the subsequent sections we describe our models for vehicle
flow and human choices. Following that we return with a
mathematical formulation of this optimization.
III. LEARNING THE HUMAN CHOICE MODEL
In this section we describe how both human drivers and
the autonomous service users make routing decisions. We
then provide a data-efficient learning algorithm for estimating
the way that the autonomous service users make routing
decisions, allowing us to predict the response a population
will have to a set of latency/price options.
Human Drivers. We consider a network of N parallel roads,
an example of which is shown in Fig. 3. We assume that no
two roads have the same free-flow latency and denote the
free-flow latency of path i by ai. We order the indices such
downtown to valley routes
path1
path1
Washington / Figueroa
Tujunga / Moorpark, Los
Angeles, CA, USA
path2
path2
Figueroa/Washington
Tujunga/Moorpark
path 3
path 3
Figueroa / Washington, Los
Angeles, CA, USA
Tujunga / Moorpark
Fig. 3: An example, from Los Angeles, of a network of parallel roads.
(b)
flow (cars/second)
(a)
road 1, !"
latency (seconds)
road 2, !#road 3, !$ equilibrium latency
equilibrium latency
Fig. 4: Some possible equilibria of a three-road network with fixed flow
demand. Blue and red lines denote the free-flow and congested regimes, re-
spectively. Equilibria may have (a) one road in free-flow or (b) all used roads
may be congested. An equilibrium has an associated equilibrium latency
experienced by all selfish users. By considering a given equilibrium delay,
we can reason about which roads must be congested at that equilibrium as
well how much flow is on each road.
that a1 < a2 < . . . < aN , and we use [k] to denote the set
of the first k roads.
For the human drivers, we assume their only consideration
is minimizing their commute time. This leads to a Wardrop
Equilibrium [36], [37], which, on parallel roads, means that
if one road has positive flow on it, all other roads must have
higher or equal latency. Formally,
f hi > 0 =⇒ `i(f hi , f ai , si) ≤ `i′(f hi′ , f ai′ , si′) ∀i, i′ ∈ [N ] .
This implies that all selfish users experience the same latency.
It is therefore useful to consider the flow-latency diagrams
of roads when studying which equilibria exist – by fixing
the latency on the y-axis, one can reason about which roads
must be congested to achieve that equilibrium. As shown in
Fig. 4, equilibria may have one road in free-flow and rest
congested, or all may be congested, assuming no two roads
have the same free-flow latency [4], [6].
Autonomous Service Users. Though human drivers are moti-
vated directly only by delay, users of the autonomous service
experience cost in both delay and the price of the ride. We
model the users as having some underlying reward function,
which is parameterized by their time/money tradeoff, as well
as the desirability of the option of traveling by some other
means such as walking or public transit. We assume that
a strictly dominated option in terms of latency and prices
is completely undesirable. Formally, this set of dominated
roads is defined as
D = {i ∈ [N ] | (pi > pi′ ∧ `i ≥ `i′) ∨ (pi ≥ pi′ ∧ `i > `i′)
for some i′ ∈ [N ]} .
We also define the complementary set, i.e., nondominated
roads, D¯ = [N ]\D. We model the reward function of user
j for choosing road i as follows:
rj(`,p, i) =
−ωj1`i − ωj2pi if user j chooses road i and i ∈ D¯
−∞ if user j chooses road i and i ∈ D
−ζj`w if user j declines the service ,
where ` denotes the vector of road latencies, p de-
notes prices, ωj =
[
ωj1 ωj2
]T
characterizes the users’
time/money tradeoff and ζj specifies their willingness to use
an alternative option, which has delay `w. This alternate
option could be walking, biking, or public transportation;
the nature of this option determines the delay as well and
influences ζj .
We don’t assume that users are simple reward maximizers.
Rather, we draw from Luce’s Choice Axiom [7] to model
the probability with which users choose each option, in
combination with a softmax rule [26], formalized as follows.
P (user j chooses route i) =
exp (rj(`,p, i))∑
i′∈[N ] exp (rj(`,p, i′))
.
(3)
In order to determine optimal pricing, we want to know
how many users will choose each route as a function of the
route prices and latencies. To this end, we define qi(`,p) as
the expected fraction of autonomous service users that will
choose route i. If the parameter distribution for autonomous
service users is g(ω, ζ), then
qi(`,p) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
g(ω, ζ)P (user chooses route i|ω, ζ)dω1dω2dζ .
This expression relate prices and latency to human choices,
enabling us to determine the prices that will maximize
our social objective. This will be important in constraining
our optimization to only consider latency/price options that
correspond to the desired vehicle flows.
Data-Efficient Learning of Human Reward Functions.
While the routes in a specific network can be fully modeled
with the physical properties and the speed limits, user’s
decision models must be learned in a data-driven way.
As described above, reward function parameters (ω, ζ) are
sufficient to model the decisions of a user.
The parameters will be different among the users. While
a business executive might prefer paying extra to reach their
company quickly, a graduate student may decide to go to the
lab a little later in order to save a few dollars. Therefore, we
have to learn personalized parameters ω and ζ. Although it
might be possible to make a rough guess based on personal
information, such as age, income, occupation, location, etc;
there are a few problems about this approach: 1) people
might be unwilling to share those information accurately, 2)
the variance will be high, since the decisions are also affected
by the personal traits that are hard to quantify, 3) we do not
know how we will instantiate the parameters, because putting
this as a regression problem would require some users to
explicitly quantify their ω and ζ, which is rather unrealistic.
Due to these problems, we choose to learn the parameters
from users’ previous choices, which is known as preference-
based learning. If user j chooses from a variety of options,
the user’s choice gives us a noisy estimate of which road i ∈
[N ] maximizes their reward function rj(`,p, i). We could
start from either uniform priors or priors informed by domain
knowledge, then sample from the distribution g(ω, ζ).
However, a major drawback of doing so is how quickly we
learn the user preferences. Preference-based learning suffers
from the small amount of information that each query carries.
For example, if we show 4 options to a user (including the
option to decline the service), then the maximum information
we can get from that query is just 2 bits. In fact, the
information gained can be much lower in later queries,
because the posterior is already a better estimate than the
original prior distribution. To tackle this issue, previous
works pose the query generation/synthesis problem as a
submodular optimization and maximize a measure of the
expected change in the learned distribution after the queries.
[10], [11].
While those works focused only on pairwise queries, in
this case we expect to pose several route options to the users
and therefore need more general query types. By using these
more general queries that offer a variety of routes with varied
latencies and prices, we can consider a number of ways of
using this learning framework to learn the human preference
distribution.
• We could do a user study on a few people to learn
a good prior distribution. While we could achieve this
using random queries, it would take too many queries
to learn a useful distribution and most of the queries
would not be sensible. By utilizing active learning, we
are able to learn the parameters of each user using only
a few queries.
• We could do an exploration/exploitation strategy if we
are allowed to break the fairness constraint a few times
for some small portion of the users. This could be
possible through user-specific campaigns. That is, for
each user we may either choose to use the learned model
or to offer special rates that would help us profile the
user better.
• We could do an initial profiling study for each new user,
where we ask them queries synthesized by the active
learning framework.
To implement any of these options, we formulate the
following active learning optimization. First, we discuss the
general preference-based learning framework. Given the data
from previous choices of user j, which we denote as Dj ,
we can formalize the probability of (ωj , ζj) being true
parameters for that user as follows:
P (ωj , ζj |Dj) ∝ P (ωj , ζj)P (Dj |ωj , ζj)
= P (ωj , ζj)
∏
m
P (Djm|ωj , ζj)
where Djm denotes the route user j chose in their mth choice
(with Djm = 0 meaning that the user saw the options, but
preferred the alternative option). The first expression is due
to Bayes’ rule and the equality is due to the assumption that
the users’ choices are conditionally independent from each
other given the reward function parameters.
We can readily obtain the second term from the human
choice model. For the prior, we can simply use a uniform
distribution over nonnegative values of the parameters. The
prior can be crucial especially when we do not have enough
data for a new user. In such settings, we incorporate do-
main knowledge to start with a better prior than a uniform
distribution.
We can then use this unnormalized P (ωj , ζj |Dj) to obtain
the samples of (ωj , ζj) using Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
Doing this for each user, which can be easily parallelized,
we can directly obtain the samples (ω¯, ζ¯) ∼ g(ω, ζ).
Next we formulate the active learning framework, which is
needed so that it will not take an excessive number of queries
to learn human preferences. For this, we want to maximize
the expectation of the difference between the prior and the
unnormalized posterior:
query∗m = arg max
querym
EDjm
[
P (ωj , ζj |Dj1:m−1)−
P (ωj , ζj |Dj1:m−1)P (Djm|ωj , ζj ,Dj1:m−1)
]
= arg min
querym
EDjm
[
P (Djm|ωj , ζj ,Dj1:m−1)
]
As we will use the sampled (ωj , ζj) for computing the
probabilities of each route choice for the expectation over
Djm, we can write the optimization as:
query∗m
·
= arg min
querym
EDjm
∑
ω¯j ,ζ¯j
P (Djm|ω¯j , ζ¯j ,Dj1:m−1)

where we have M samples denoted as (ω¯j , ζ¯j),
·
= denotes
asymptotic equality as M → ∞, and the term 1/M is
canceled. Using the law of total probability, we can also
write
P (Djm|Dj1:m−1)
=
∑
ωj ,ζj
P (ωj , ζj |Dj1:m−1)P (Djm|Dj1:m−1,ωj , ζj)
·
=
1
M
∑
ω¯j ,ζ¯j
P (Djm|ω¯j , ζ¯j ,Dj1:m−1)
which then leads to
query∗m
·
=arg min
querym
∑
Djm
P (Djm|Dj1:m−1)
∑
ω¯j ,ζ¯j
P (Djm|ω¯j , ζ¯j ,Dj1:m−1)
·
=arg min
querym
∑
Djm
∑
ω¯j ,ζ¯j
P (Djm|ω¯j , ζ¯j)
2
We can easily compute this objective value for any given
querym. This optimization is unfortunately nonconvex due to
the human choice model. As in previous works, we assume
local optima is good enough [10], [11]. We then use a Quasi-
Newton method (L-BFGS [38]) to find the local optima, and
we repeat this for 1000 times starting from random initial
points so that we can get closer to the global optimum.
IV. INFLUENCING HUMAN DECISION MAKING
Problem Formulation. We are now ready to formulate our
objective. Since the demand of autonomous service users is
elastic, we cannot just minimize the average latency. That
would result in extremely high prices to reduce latency by
keeping autonomous service users off the network. Hence,
we consider the objective to be a combination of maximizing
road usage and minimizing average travel time. We parame-
terize this tradeoff with parameter θ ≥ 0 in the cost function
J(f h,f a,s)=
∑
i∈[N ] (f
h
i +f
a
i )`i(f
h
i , f
a
i , si)∑
i∈[N ] (f
h
i + f
a
i )
−θ
∑
i∈[N ]
(f hi+f
a
i ) .
Given q(`,p), the cost function J(f h,f a, s), inelastic
flow demand of human drivers λh, and elastic demand of
autonomous users λa, we are ready to formulate the planning
optimization. The most straightforward way is to optimize
jointly over f h,f a, ` and p. However, ` is fully defined by
f h,f a and s. Hence, instead of `, we use s, which will help
as the optimization is nonconvex and we can search over the
possible values of s. The problem is then formulated as:
min
f h,f a,p∈RN≥0,k∈[N ],sk:N∈{0,1}N−k+1
J(f h,f a, s) (4)
subject to
∑
i∈[N ]
f hi = λ
h (5)
f ai = λ
aqi(`(f
h,f a, s),p),∀i ∈ [N ] (6)
ak ≤ `k(f hk, f ak, sk) ≤ ak+1 (7)
f hi = 0,∀i ∈ [N ] \ [k] (8)
`i(f
h
i , f
a
i , 1) = `k(f
h
k, f
a
k, sk),∀i ∈ [k − 1] (9)
f hi + f
a
i ≤ F¯
(
f ai /(f
a
i + f
h
i )
)
,∀i ∈ [N ] (10)∑
i∈[N ]
(f ai pi − f ai dic) ≥ P¯ (11)
with s1:k−1 = 1 due to selfishness of human-driven vehicles,
where k is the longest road with human-driven vehicle flow,
P¯ is the minimum profit per unit time that we want to make
from autonomous service users and c is the constant fuel cost
per unit length, which can be easily calculated by multiplying
the vehicles’ fuel consumption per unit distance and the fuel
price. We can describe the constraints as follows.
5) The human-driven vehicle flow demand is fulfilled.
6) Autonomous flow will be distributed based on the
choice model described in the preceding section.
7) The “longest equilibrium road” has latency on the given
interval of free flow latencies.
8) Human-driven cars are selfish, i.e. no human-driven car
will experience higher latencies than the road k.
9) The congested roads have the same latency as the
“longest equilibrium road”.
10) The maximum capacities of the roads are respected.
11) The minimum profit per unit time is satisfied.
We can further improve the search space by relying on
the heuristic that the roads that are not used by the human-
driven vehicles will be in free-flow, i.e. sk+1:N = 0. While
we do not have a proof for this, we also note constructing
counterexamples seems to require extremely careful design,
which suggests the heuristic holds in general. Furthermore,
the following proposition shows we could also set sk = 0
under an additional assumption.
Proposition 1: Under the assumptions that the reward
function is homogeneous among the users and ω2 > 0,
there exists a free-flow road k in the optimal solution to
the problem such that `i = `k for ∀i ∈ [k], and f hi = 0 for
∀i ∈ [N ] \ [k] as long as the optimization is feasible.
The proof is given in Appendix.
Generalizations. We assumed all autonomous cars are
controlled by a centralized social planner. To extend our
framework to scenarios where this is not the case and the
social planner has the control over a fraction of autonomous
cars, we can simply do the following modifications: The
optimization will also be over f b ∈ RN≥0, which will now
represent the autonomous flow that does not belong to the
planner. We add the corresponding constraint of 5 for f bi .
Similar to 8, we will also have f bi = 0 for i ∈ [N ] \ [k]
due to selfishness. We will also replace f a’s in 7, 9 and
10 with f a + f b with appropriate subscripts. These simple
modifications enable a more general use.
Solving the Optimization. After learning the distribution
g(ω, ζ), we first take M samples (ω¯, ζ¯) ∼ g(ω, ζ) as we
previously described in Section III. Using these samples, we
approximate the expected fraction of autonomous users that
will choose route i as:
qi(`,p)
·
=
1
M
∑
ω¯,ζ¯
P (user chooses route i|ω¯, ζ¯)
We then locally solve the nonconvex planning optimization
using interior point algorithms [39]–[41]. We execute the
algorithms with 100 random initial points for each run to
get closer to global optimum.
V. EXPERIMENTS & RESULTS
To validate our framework, we conducted different simu-
lations and a user study.
Hypotheses. We test three hypotheses that together sug-
gest our framework successfully reduces traffic congestion
through pricing, after it effectively learns the humans’ choice
models:
H1: Our active learning algorithm is able to learn the
presented human choice model of autonomous service users
in a data-efficient way.
H2: Our planning optimization reduces the latencies by
creating altruistic behavior through pricing.
H3: When used by humans, the overall framework works
well and is advantageous over non-altruistic algorithms.
Implementation Details. In the planning optimization, we
used the heuristic that sk+1:N = 0, but did not set sk = 0. We
assumed there is only one alternative option for autonomous
service users, and it is walking to the destination. We set c =
6× 10−5 USD/meter, b = 1. We assumed the human-driven
cars keep a 2-second headway distance with the leading car,
whereas autonomous cars keep 1-second distance. We set the
length of the cars as 5 meters, and the minimum gap between
two cars as 2 meters.
Experiments and Analyses. To test H1, we simulated 5
autonomous service users with different preferences. We
tested our data-efficient learning framework by asking two
sets of 200 queries, each of which consisted of 4 road
options, similar to Fig. 7, and a walking option, to the
simulated users. The queries were generated actively in the
first set and randomly in the second. After each query, we
recorded the sample (ω¯, ζ¯) which has the highest likelihood
as our estimates.
Fig. 5 shows how the estimates evolved within active
learning setting for one of the users. All values are overes-
timated initially. This is intuitively because getting noiseless
responses has higher likelihood. As we query more, accept-
ing some of the responses as noisy maximizes the likelihood.
Therefore, the values start decreasing.
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Fig. 5: The errors of the reward function estimates are shown with varying
number of queries. ωˆ1, ωˆ2 and ζˆ represent the parameters of the sample
with the highest likelihood.
Another important observation is that the estimates of
the parameters increase and decrease together even in the
early iterations. This suggests we are able to learn the ratio
between the parameters, e.g. ω1/ω2 very quickly. To check
this claim, we used the following error metric:
ex,y = ‖x/y − xˆ/yˆ‖1
where x, y ∈ {ω1, ω2, ζ} and xˆ, yˆ stand for the parameters
x, y of the sample with the highest likelihood. Figure 6
shows how this error decreases with increasing number of
queries. It also shows how active querying enables data-
efficient learning compared to the random querying baseline.
This indicates we are able to learn the relationship between
parameters even under 20 queries with active learning. All
these results strongly support H1.
The fact that we are able to learn the ratios implies we can
estimate which road the user is most likely to choose. We will
only be unsure about how noisy the user is if the parameter
estimates did not converge yet. Therefore, we can still use
the estimates for our planning optimization formulation even
when we have small number of queries.
Fig. 6: The error metric is averaged over 5 different reward functions, and
the results are plotted. Active learning framework provides a data-efficient
way of learning by converging fast.
Fig. 7: The 4-road network from [4]. The roads are not to the scale and
ordered with respect to the free-flow latencies.
To test H2, we adopt 3 of the equilibria from [4] for
comparison, namely, Nash Equilibrium where all drivers are
selfish; Best Nash Equilibrium which gives the smallest av-
erage latency again with selfish drivers; and Fully Altruistic
Best Nash Equilibrium which gives the smallest average
latency where autonomous users are fully altruistic and
human-driven cars route selfishly. Here, we give the average
latencies for the specific 4-road network from that study
which we visualize in Fig. 7, and where λh = 0.4, λa = 1.2
cars per second:
• Nash Equilibrium: 400.00 seconds
• Best Nash Equilibrium: 125.66 seconds
• Fully Altruistic Best Nash Equilibrium: 102.85 seconds
We then assumed we perfectly learned the preferences of
the 5 simulated users. We ran the planning optimization with
P¯ = 0 and 3 different θ to show the trade-off. The results
are summarized in Table I.
TABLE I: Results of Routing Simulation
θ Avg. Latency (seconds) Flow (cars/second)
1 90.41 0.4412
20 97.03 1.2746
106 111.28 1.5964
It can be seen we can adjust the trade-off between average
latency and the served flow by tuning θ. Also, given the
human preferences, even when we served (almost) all of
autonomous demand, our framework outperforms Best Nash
Equilibrium. This shows the effectiveness of our framework
on creating altruism and supports H2.
For H3, we recruited 21 subjects (9 female, 12 male) with
an age range from 19 to 60. To increase the diversity among
user preferences, the subjects are selected from a diverse set
of locations: California / Georgia / Illinois, USA; Ankara /
Denizli, Turkey; Sao Paulo, Brazil; Singapore.
In the first phase of the experiment, each participant
was asked 40 queries (4 roads + 1 walking option) which
are all actively synthesized. No user has selected a strictly
dominated option in any query, which indicates the data
are reliable. We then used their responses to get the max-
imum likelihood estimates which we approximate as the
sample (ω¯, ζ¯) that has the highest likelihood. Afterwards,
we designed 5 different road networks each with 4 different
roads and an additional route where people may choose
to walk. The roads on the 5 different networks cover a
range of different road lengths from 1.8 kilometers to 78
kilometers. For each network, we also set different θ, λh, λa,
and P¯ . By assuming all autonomous flow is in the service
of these 21 subjects, or of the groups that match with their
preferences, we locally solved the planning optimization to
obtain the pricing scheme for each traffic network. We refer
to the results of this optimization as anticipated values, e.g.
anticipated profit.
In the second phase of the user study, we presented the
route-price pairs and the walking option to the same 21
subjects. For each of the 5 networks, they picked the option
they would prefer. Using these responses, we allocated the
autonomous flow into the roads. However, it is technically
possible that more users select a road than its maximum flow.
To handle such cases, we assumed extra flow is transferred
to the roads with smaller latencies without making the users
pay more. If that is not feasible, extra flow is transferred to
the slower roads, without any discount. While these break
the fairness constraint, it rarely happens and affects only a
very small portion of the flow. After autonomous flows are
allocated, human driven cars selfishly chose their routes in a
way to minimize the overall average latency. We refer to the
results of this allocation as actual values, e.g. actual profit.
Table II compares the anticipated and the actual values.
We report latencies in seconds, flows in cars per second, and
profit is a rate value with the unit USD per second. In order to
show how our framework incentivizes altruistic behavior, we
also added two other selfish best Nash equilibrium baselines:
one where the same flow as actual flow is routed (BNE1) and
one where all flow demand is routed (no walking option)
again under best Nash equilibrium (BNE2).
It can be seen that there is generally an alignment between
anticipated and actual values. While the mismatch may be
further reduced by doing more queries or having more
users, the difference with BNE methods is significant. In
all cases, our framework achieved to incentivize altruism,
which yielded lower average latencies compared to BNE1.
Especially in Case 3 and Case 5, our framework approx-
imately halved the average latency compared to the best
Nash equilibria. We visualize this difference in Fig. 8. Fur-
thermore, our framework successfully reduced flow demand
when satisfying the full demand is impossible (Case 1).
One caveat is the small amount of actual flow in Case 1,
which also caused an important profit loss. This is because
the roads are relatively shorter, and most users preferred
walking over paying for an autonomous car. Our framework
could not predict this, because the learned reward functions
failed to accurately estimate the probabilities. This issue will
be further discussed in Section VI.
TABLE II: Results of Real-User Experiments
Anticipated Actual BNE1 BNE2
Avg. Latency Flow Profit Avg. Latency Flow Profit Avg. Latency Flow Avg. Latency Flow
Case 1 338.10 1.6622 11.11 283.30 1.0429 3.85 501.97 1.0429 Infeasible
Case 2 510.97 1.5592 4.50 537.30 1.5048 3.95 562.20 1.5048 562.20 1.6000
Case 3 921.06 1.2677 4.59 957.71 1.3000 3.99 1756.89 1.3000 1756.89 1.3000
Case 4 2083.42 1.2383 48.48 2089.53 1.2048 46.32 4194.26 1.2048 4194.26 1.3000
Case 5 2576.36 1.5538 40.01 2579.52 1.6000 49.33 2720.00 1.6000 2720.00 1.6000
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5
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Fig. 8: The comparison of the actual results and BNE1, both of which
allocate the same amount of flow. Our framework consistently reduces the
average latency.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we develop a method improving the effi-
ciency of traffic networks shared between human-driven and
autonomous vehicles by influencing the routing behavior of
humans. Considering an autonomous service that offers a
choice of a number of routes, we formulate an optimization
to find the prices that influence autonomous user choices so
that when users choose their routes, and the human-driven
traffic routes solely based on travel delay, travel delay is
minimized and road usage is maximized. In order to do
so, we model how people choose between between routes
with differing prices and latencies, and develop a method to
actively learn the choice model parameters for a population
of users. We verify these mechanisms through an experiment
with real human choice data.
There are areas in which our mechanism can be improved.
Specifically, one could further refine the reward function
model for autonomous service users and not necessarily
assume that it’s linear. One could also consider the human-
driven vehicle demand to be elastic, meaning that people
may choose to stay home or choose public transportation if
congestion is high. Further, we find that when solving the
planning optimization using actual data from user choices,
the profit constraint is often unsatisfied. To manage this, we
could instead include profit as part of the objective function
or optimize for the worst-case performance.
We considered only a single alternative to the autonomous
service use. However, a population may choose from a
variety of options such as walking, biking, or taking the
bus, ζ will have a multimodal distribution; we then need
to learn the mixture. Finally, it is unclear if it is better
to use many samples from our posterior on (ω, ζ) or just
the maximum likelihood sample while computing q for the
planning optimization.
Future work can address these issues or expand in broader
directions. It would be worthwhile to look at more general
network topologies. Further, the information that people have
access plays a huge role in decision making. It would be
enlightening to develop choice models that incorporate this
information availability as well as possibly other aspects of
decision making, such as risk aversion. These expansions
would do much to address congestion on roads that are
soon to be shared between human drivers and autonomous
vehicles.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Let us call the reward function that is homogeneous
among the users as r¯. Assume the optimal solution is
(`∗,p∗,f h
∗
,f a
∗
), and `∗k > ak, where k = arg maxi ai
subject to f h∗i > 0. Due to selfishness, we know `i = `k
for ∀i ∈ [k]. Also, let D∗ (and D¯∗) be the set of dominated
(undominated) options under the optimal solution.
Let (`′,p′) be such that
• `′i = `
∗
i and p
′
i = p
∗
i , for ∀i ∈ [N ] \ [k],
• ak ≤ `′k < `∗k,
• `′i = `
′
k, for ∀i ∈ [k − 1],
• p′i = p
∗
i +  where  > 0 for ∀i ∈ [k] ∪D∗,
• q(`′,p′) = q(`∗,p∗) for i ∈ [k] .
We also define D′ and D¯′ similarly. The only two free
variables of (`′,p′) are `′k and . To show such an (`
′,p′)
with the last constraint exists, we prove 1) For any `′k, there
exists an  such that r¯(`∗,p∗, i) = r¯(`′,p′, i) for ∀i ∈ [k],
2) D∗ = D′. These together imply r¯(`∗,p∗, i) = r¯(`′,p′, i)
for ∀i ∈ [N ], which then implies the last constraint.
The first one is easy to show. r¯(`∗,p∗, i) = r¯(`∗,p∗, k)
for ∀i ∈ [k]. For any `′k, we can set  = ω1ω2 (`∗k − `′k) to get
r¯(`′,p′, i) = r¯(`∗,p∗, i) for ∀i ∈ [k] where ω is associated
with r¯. The equality also holds for i ∈ [N ] \ [k], because
the prices and latencies are the same between (`∗,p∗) and
(`′,p′) in those roads.
We show D∗ = D′ in two steps:
1) D∗ ∩ [k] = D′ ∩ [k], since the roads had the same latency
drop and price increase, and they cannot be dominated by
any of [N ] \ [k], because they have strictly lower latency.
2) D∗ \ [k] = D′ \ [k], because the roads have the same
latency between two configurations and the prices went up
only for those in D∗, so they cannot dominate each other in
a different way between the configurations. They also cannot
dominate any of the roads in [k], because they have strictly
higher latency. And i ∈ D′ \ [k] =⇒ i ∈ D∗ \ [k], because
the roads in [k] had already lower latency in the optimal
solution and their prices only went up.
Having showed (`′,p′) exists, we note (`′,p′,f h
′
,f a
∗
)
is a feasible solution for some f h
′
, because the distribu-
tion of autonomous service users remained the same and
the prices went only up, which together means the profit
constraint (11) is still satisfied. The other constraints are
trivially satisfied by the construction of (`′,p′) and as the
optimal solution has to be feasible. Then, since the demand
of human-driven cars are inelastic, the total served flow is
the same between two solutions. However, the latencies of
the roads in [k] decreased, which means their capacities
increased. Hence, k ≥ arg maxi ai subject to f h′i > 0.
Then, the average latencies of human-driven cars decreased.
Similarly, the average latencies of autonomous service users
may only go down. Hence, J(f h
∗
,f a
∗
, s∗)>J(f h
′
,f a
′
, s′),
and (`∗,p∗,f h
∗
,f a
∗
) cannot be the optimal solution. 
